Thanks to Anna Nicole Smith and the June 2011 landmark Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall, there are seemingly more questions regarding a bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final orders (or even proposed orders) than ever before. Those unanswered questions have created considerable uncertainty and, not surprisingly, lengthier and costlier litigation in bankruptcy. Thankfully, the Supremes decided on June 24, 2013 that they will address two of the many questions left unanswered by Stern.

Navigating the most recent leg in the Quebecor regatta, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and ruled that prepetition transfers made in connection with a securities contract may qualify for safe harbor from avoidance actions under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code—even if the transferee is a mere “conduit” or “intermediary” financial institution. In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc. (Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance Co.), No. 12-4270-bk (2d Cir. June 10, 2013).

On a matter of first impression, the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion in the Derivium Capital, LLC bankruptcy case on May 24, 2013,1 affirming the District Court’s ruling that Grayson Consulting Inc. ("Grayson"), the chapter 7 Trustee’s assignee, could not avoid as fraudulent conveyances Wachovia’s2 commissions, fees, and margin interest payments because those payments were protected from recovery by the safe harbor of United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") section 546(e).

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court recently held that a third amendment to a lease agreement entered into for the purpose of leasing a second building could not be severed from the original lease agreement; and the debtor was not allowed to reject the lease on that second building under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

It was just an old jalopy legally repossessed by his credit union . . . until he filed a bankruptcy petition and the red lights of the automatic stay started flashing. Smokey pulled the lender over and started issuing citations so be forewarned, put your hazard lights on and drive carefully through the postpetition fog, because this decision is relevant to all secured creditors under all Bankruptcy Code Chapters, not just car lenders under Chapter 13.

On April 16, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Second Circuit") issued its decision in In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.,¹ in which the court held that (1) the relevant time for analyzing a debtor’s center of main interest ("COMI") for purposes of recognizing a foreign proceeding is at or around the time a petition for recognition is filed; (2) the determination of COMI is dependent on the facts of each case, which may include insolvency proceedings in the foreign jurisdiction; and (3) the public policy exception to relief sough

On March 1, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. et al, (Inre Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C.)¹ (“Texas Grand Prairie”) affirming an order of the bankruptcy court confirming a debtor’s plan of reorganization over the objection the secured creditor that argued that the interest rate proposed by the plan to be paid to the secured creditor was too low in violation of 11 U.S.C. §1129(b).

On February 26, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.¹ (“Camp Bowie”). The bankruptcy court confirmed a debtor’s plan of reorganization over the objection of the secured creditor that argued the impaired accepting class of the cramdown plan was “artificially” impaired and that the plan was not proposed in good faith.

On February 14, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In re Castleton Plaza, LP,¹ became the first court of appeals to consider whether a competitive auction is required when a debtor’s plan of reorganization provides an “insider” that does not hold an equity interest in the debtor with an exclusive option to purchase equity in exchange for new value since the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 203 N. LaSalle² more than a decade ago.

On January 17, 2013, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit BAP”) rendered its opinion in Massachusetts Department of Unemployment Assistance v. OPK Biotech, LLC (In re PBBPC, Inc.), BAP No. MB 12-042 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. Jan.