There has been a relatively recent uptick in plaintiffs’ counsel filing putative class actions in multiple state and federal courts for alleged violations of a debtor’s bankruptcy discharge injunction based upon the debtor’s receipt of post-discharge mortgage-related communications. These claims assert putative class action challenges to post-discharge communications alleged to be attempts at personal collection of the discharged mortgage debt.
Have you ever had to press garlic for a recipe? Or put together a Swedish bookshelf, purchased from a Swedish superstore? Yes, you have – and you may have succeeded, so long as you had a garlic press, or the bag of special Swedish tools respectively. But what if you don’t? Yikes.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed whether estate professionals could recover fees expended in defending fee applications. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. _____ (2015). A divided court ruled that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) allowed compensation only for “actual, necessary services rendered[,]” and that to allow fees for defending fee applications would be contrary to the statute and the “American Rule” that each litigant pay her own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to interpret ambiguous, imprecise, and otherwise puzzling language in the Bankruptcy Code, including the phrases “claim,” “interest in property,” “ordinary course of business,” “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” “allowed secured claim,” “willful and malicious injury,” “on account of,” “value, as of the effective date of the plan,” “projected disposable income,” “defalcation,” and “retirement funds.” The interpretive principles employed by the Court in interpreting the peculiarities of the Bankruptcy Code were in full view when the Court r
When a bankrupt company’s most valuable assets include consumer information, a tension arises between bankruptcy policy aimed at maximizing asset value, on the one hand, and privacy laws designed to protect consumers’ personal information, on the other.
The English High Court in Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance S.A. and Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch) applied a common sense approach in the circumstances to the determination of Loss under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement. The judgment of the judge (Mr Justice David Richards) is useful reading for those involved in structured products and derivatives.
Background
Social media accounts can be “property of the estate” in a bankruptcy case of a business, and thus belong to the business, even when the contents of the accounts are intermingled with personal content of managers and owners. This principle was recently confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in In re CTLI, LLC (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr.
We don’t know about you, but we’ve been following the contentious litigation between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and debt-relief services company Morgan Drexen pretty closely. The CFPB filed its lawsuit in August 2013, alleging, among other things, that the company deceived consumers into paying unlawful up-front fees for debt relief services by disguising them as fees related to “sham” bankruptcy services.
Client Alert February 5, 2015 Second Circuit to Lenders: Get Your UCC Filings Right By Geoffrey R. Peck and Jordan A. Wishnew1 INTRODUCTION On January 21, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an opinion regarding a mistaken UCC-3 termination statement that all loan market participants should consider carefully.