The language of Bankruptcy Code § 501(a) is as broad as it is simple.

On November 23, 2015, in the first appellate decision of its kind, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed a bankruptcy court order to compel chapter 7 debtors to surrender real property by directing the debtors to cease all foreclosure defense. The decision in Failla v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Failla), case no. 15-80328, marks the first decision from a federal appellate court to address the question of whether a bankruptcy court may enter an order directing a debtor to cease defending a mortgage foreclosure suit pending in state court.

Individuals filing for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") generally do so to have their debts discharged and receive the proverbial "fresh start."2 The same, however, is not true for corporations.

In Jenkins v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,^[1]the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that the filing of a proof of claim based on a time-barred debt cannot give rise to a claim for damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), reasoning that any such claim is precluded by the Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive claims-allowance procedure.

Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.

Much has been written of late about data breaches and the liabilities for the unauthorized acquisition of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from institutions, including financial institutions. But what about when the alleged “breach”--the release of information --is voluntarily and/or legally compelled? What are the risks for creditors who take collateral, in security for the repayment of debt, containing PII data? What are the risks to businesses when they transfer assets that include PII? What liabilities do they face? What are the rights of customers?

On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.

Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.

Much has been written of late about data breaches and the liabilities for the unauthorized acquisition of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from institutions. But what about when the alleged “breach”--the release of information --is voluntarily and/or legally compelled? What are the risks to businesses when they sell assets that include PII? What liabilities do they face? What are the rights of customers?

Radio Shack – The pioneer of PII data collection

Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (“FDCPA”). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan.