Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim

A. Statute of Limitations

On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.

– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.

In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).

The Court of Appeal has reiterated some important rules for funders involved in debt purchase. Banking Litigation specialist Alasdair Urwin looks at the recent case of Bibby Factors Northwest v HDF and MCD [1].

Buyer beware

This case concerned a factoring agreement, pursuant to which a funder (Bibby) purchased unpaid invoices from another company (the Assignor), including debts owing from the defendant companies (the Customers).

In Stevensdrake Ltd v Hunt and others ^[1] the liquidator of Sunbow Limited, Mr Hunt, had brought a claim against Sunbow's former administrators. Mr Hunt entered into a conditional fee agreement (CFA) with the solicitors instructed to pursue the claim (Stevensdrake). The CFA stated "if you [Mr Hunt] win your claim, you pay our basic charges, our disbursements and a success fee". A settlement was agreed but one of the former administrators failed to pay the agreed sum.

The definition of a contract for the sale of goods under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SOGA) is one in which the seller transfers the property in the goods to the buyer for money consideration, i.e. the price.

Under section 49 of SOGA, an unpaid seller can claim for the price of the goods if either: (1) the property in the goods has passed to the buyer; (2) or payment of the price is expressed to be payable on a certain day irrespective of delivery

In Brooks and another v Armstrong ^[1], joint liquidators applied for orders against directors of the insolvent company (the Company) under section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the Act) (the wrongful trading provision) and for remedies to be awarded against delinquent directors under section 212 of the Act.

On 1 April 2015, an estimated 5,000 private landlords across Liverpool were affected by the implementation of a city-wide selective licensing scheme. Whilst Liverpool is the first major city to introduce the scheme city-wide, several local authorities have adopted selective licensing for their boroughs including the London Boroughs of Newham, Hackney, Croydon and Brent. 

Following on from our earlier advice on enforcing money judgments, Walker Morris’ banking litigators answer some more frequently asked questions.

Client Question 3

I have heard that I can enforce a money judgment via a third party debt order or an attachment of earnings.  What are these and what are the advantages/disadvantages?

Walker Morris Answer