On May 23, 2017, Don A. Beskrone, the chapter 7 trustee for the estate of PennySaver USA Publishing, LLC filed preference actions against 46 defendants. PennySaver was an iconic company that specialized in the production, printing, and dissemination of a free weekly publication, offering coupons and classified ads to targeted audiences.

“You have been served” – the famous phrase uttered by process servers everywhere, may never be heard by a bankruptcy defendant.

Why?

On May 17, 2017, GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (“GulfMark” or “Debtor”) filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit (the “Court”) considered the issue of asset “abandonment” in a Chapter 7 case[1]. The Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow the Chapter 7 trustee to compromise a claim that the debtor argued the trustee had abandoned.

Background

On May 8, 2017, Judge Gross ruled on a Motion to Compel Production of Documents in the Haggen bankruptcy. Judge Gross’ opinion (the “Opinion”) addresses the conflict when a party is acting on another’s behalf and that entity claims “the oldest of the common law privileges”. Opinion at *5. A copy of the Opinion is available here.

Starting on April 28, 2017, Craig R. Jalbert, as Distribution Trustee of the Corinthian Distribution Trust, filed approximately 122 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548, 549 and and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code (depending upon the nature of the underlying transactions). The Distribution Trustee also seeks to disallow claims of such defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In the case of Susan G. Brown v. Douglas Ellmann [1], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (the “Sixth Circuit”) recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision to deny a Chapter 7 debtor’s proposed exemptions for the value of redemption rights she enjoyed under Michigan law related to the sale of a property she surrendered to the bankruptcy estate.

Background

Whether a claim against company management is direct or derivative is not infrequently disputed in litigation before the Delaware Court of Chancery. This determination becomes important in many contexts, including whether it was necessary for plaintiff to make a pre-suit demand upon the board, whether derivative claims of a company have been assigned to a receiver, or whether such claims have previously been settled in a prior litigation.

Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

In the recent decision of In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017), Judge Sontchi held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to counsel to the creditors committee in a case with a confirmed chapter 11 plan.