The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1
What is a Structured Dismissal?
The new Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) enacted in 2012 was the first part of the effort to rewrite the statutory provisions relating to the incorporation and operation of companies. The remaining task of updating the winding up and insolvency provisions was completed in May 2016, when amendments to the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) (CWUMPO) were passed into law. Although the implementation date of these amendments are to be announced by the government, it is time to look at the significant changes ahead.
The proposed bankruptcy sale of Golfsmith International Holdings to Dick’s Sporting Goods was recently approved, after the privacy ombudsman recommended that almost 10,000,000 consumer records (i.e., the personal information of consumers) of Golfsmith International Holdings can be transferred to Dick’s Sporting Goods.
In Essar Steel Algoma Inc. (Re), Justice David Brown of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the ambit of orders “made under” the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the “CCAA”), and thus requiring leave to be appealed, is broad. Though concluding that the appellant in this case required leave to appeal, he nonetheless ordered the leave motion be expedited.
In his decision in Global Royalties Limited v. Brook, Chief Justice Strathy of the Ontario Court of Appeal explained that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) does not provide a bankrupt with a right to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings against him. Despite there being a multi-party bankruptcy, he rejected the submission that “the order or decision is likely to affect other cases of a similar nature in the bankruptcy proceedings”.
Introduction
In Walchuk Estate v. Houghton, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a motion to quash an appeal on the basis that the lower court’s adjournment of a contempt motion was a final order. The decision also provides guidance, yet again, on the proper test for distinguishing between final and interlocutory orders.
Background
The media have been paying considerable attention to the current financial distress of the energy industry in Alberta, focusing primarily on the impact a company’s financial condition can have on its stakeholders, including its employees, shareholders and creditors. But there is another group that is also being affected: counterparties to commercial arrangements with insolvent companies. Increasingly, financially strong companies are having to deal with insolvent joint venture partners, financially distressed operators, and bankrupt lessees.
In a proceeding under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”), a judge has discretionary powers to, among other things, order debtor companies into bankruptcy and thereby resolve priority disputes. What should be the standard of review of such discretionary decisions? Historically, the standard has been high.
Following the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (Indalex), creditors and their advisors have been closely following jurisprudence which considers the scope of the decision.