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The usage of pre-pack insolvency sales is less developed in Ireland than in other jurisdictions, but there has been an increasing number of asset sales structured through pre-pack receiverships over the last year. The most recent successful example was the sale of the A-Wear retail chain by its receiver Jim Luby of McStay Luby. In July 2011 the Superquinn grocery chain was sold to Musgraves by its receivers Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG, in what was probably the largest ever pre-pack transaction in this market. 

Once a company has entered into a formal insolvency process, all its assets must be realised and distributed in accordance with the Companies Acts. An attempt to prefer a particular creditor up to two years prior to an insolvent liquidation can be declared void by the courts on the application of the liquidator of the insolvent company. To succeed on such an application, however, the liquidator must prove that the dominant intention of the insolvent company at the time it entered into the transaction was to prefer the creditor in question.

This blog is supposed to be about real estate, mostly commercial real estate.  So when one of my Celtic-supporting partners who has been watching avidly every twist and turn of the Rangers saga said I should read the latest court judgement and what it said about property law, I was a little surprised.  But there is quite a lot that is relevant to what we do on a day to day basis.

In an earlier blog I touched upon the belief which exists within certain parts of the market that there is still a way to go in the re-pricing of non-prime assets. Some commentators are predicting that this re-pricing will take place through 2012 and into 2013, the hope being that we will start to see greater activity in the secondary market in the second half of next year.

The Court of Appeal has clarified in the case of Key2law (Surrey) LLP v Gaynor De’Antiquis [2011] EWCA Civ 1567 that administration proceedings do not constitute “insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor” in terms of regulation 8(7) of the TUPE Regulations 2006 and therefore fall outside the scope of regulation 8(7).

In its judgment of 11 October 2011, the English Court of Appeal analysed the terms of an aircraft purchase agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by Gesner and the aircraft manufacturer Bombardier.  The Agreement was in Bombardier’s standard terms.  Gesner, the purchaser, sought to terminate the agreement on the grounds that Bombardier had delayed in fulfilling its contractual obligations.  Thereafter, Bombardier sought to retain certain monies as liquidated damages upon termination of the Agreement.  Gesner challenged this retention.

Application for an administration order in respect of FM Front Door Ltd. The application followed FM’s failure to make payments under a loan from the Dunfermline Building Society obtained to assist with the purchase of flats at the Skyline development on Finniestoun Street in Glasgow.  The loan was secured by a floating charge and standard securities over each of the flats. FM’s parent company FM Developments also granted a guarantee for the loan.

Clause 13 of the loan agreement provided that the grounds for default included:

A recent Supreme Court judgement has confirmed that where an individual, Mr X, acts as director of company A, and company A is the sole director of company B, that will not necessarily make Mr X a “de facto” director of company B.

The Court decided that the mere fact of acting as a director of a corporate director was not enough to render the individual a de-facto director, “something more” would be required, such as the director holding himself out in correspondence as a director of company B.

Rainy Sky SA et al v Kookmin Bank [2010] All ER (D) 255 (May) In our Spring 2010 e-news we reported on the case of Kookmin Bank which dealt with the interpretation of a refund guarantee between Kookmin Bank (the “Bank”) and the customer of an insolvent shipyard. The Bank issued a refund guarantee to secure obligations assumed by its customer Jinse Shipbuilding (the “Builder”). The agreement required the Bank to repay on demand all of the instalments paid by the buyer, Rainy Sky, on the occurrence of a default event under the refund guarantee.

Section 113 of the Housing Grants, Construction & Regeneration Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) outlaws pay when paid provisions, with one exception. It is permissible for a Contractor to use a pay when paid provision to deny payment of outstanding amounts due to its Sub-contractor where the Client at the top of the supply chain has gone bust. The general consensus is of course that this exception is unfair. It is essentially asking the Sub-contractors to act as insurers of both the main Contractor and Client insolvency.