There is much to report since our last update on Voyager Digital’s bankruptcy case discussed here.

Now that their bankruptcy filing is a few weeks behind us, we provide below an update on certain matters of interest in the case of Celsius Networks and its affiliates. Of course, it’s still very early in the bankruptcy case — and in cryptocurrency cases in general — but we have already heard from many distressed opportunity investors that are interested in identifying investment opportunities. Given the novel legal and difficult valuation issues involved, it will be important to keep a close eye on the developments in these proceedings.

We recently discussed the establishment of the Corporate Enforcement Authority (CEA) with effect from 7 July 2022, and the commencement of the Companies (Corporate Enforcement Authority) Act 2021 (CEA Act). With the commencement of the CEA Act, some insolvency-related amendments to the Companies Act 2014 (CA 2014) are now in force.

In a matter of first impression relating to an important bankruptcy claims administration issue, Judge Sean H. Lane of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, recently denied the ability of a court appointed claims agent to sell and profit from providing direct access to publicly available claims register information. The unsuccessful purchaser of such information was XClaim Inc. (“Xclaim”), a relatively new venture that is seeking to develop a web-based claims trading platform.

The first week of July has brought with it a flurry of activity in the digital asset markets – but not the type of activity that investors in the space likely hoped for.

Celsius Networks (“Celsius”) became the latest cryptocurrency platform to raise market temperatures by halting all withdrawals, swaps and transfers from and between its customers’ accounts on June 12, 2022. Celsius touted a next wave of “unbanking,” operating a lending platform allowing the holders of digital assets the opportunity to earn a significantly high returns on those assets.

With the beginnings of the coronavirus pandemic, 2020 brought an onslaught of retail bankruptcy cases. Lord & Taylor, Ascena Brands, Neiman Marcus and JC Penny, among many others – not less than 52 in total. As the economy recovered from the initial shock of the pandemic, the number of retail bankruptcy cases subsided in 2021. According to reports, there were 21 retail cases in 2021 as retail traffic began returning to pre-pandemic levels. 2022, however, brings new pressures on the global economy, and certain that may strike the retail industry with force.

Given the recent media coverage and growing concerns among investors over the risks associated with a bankruptcy filing of a cryptocurrency exchange, it feels timely to highlight some issues that arose in the Chapter 11 cases of Cred Inc. and certain of its affiliates (collectively, “Cred”).

Unitranche financing began as a middle-market product, tracing its origins to the days of recovery from the global credit crisis. The credit markets re-opened with an explosion of available capital from traditional lenders, business development companies and other direct lenders. With an increasing supply of capital, leverage shifted to borrowers and private equity, allowing them to better dictate the terms and conditions of their loan facilities. With the greater prevalence of so-called “covenant-lite” loans, also came the exponential growth of the unitranche market.

With effect from 9 May 2022, a new Order 74C of the Rules of the Superior Courts came into operation. Order 74C facilitates the operation of the Companies (Rescue Process for Small and Micro Companies) Act 2021, which inserted a new Part 10A into the Companies Act 2014 (Part 10A).