Once again, we reflect on the prior year for restructuring trends impacting private credit lenders. Last year it was all about “liability management”—the latest trend in which the limits of sponsor-favorable loan documents are being tested, in some cases past the breaking point.

The Irish High Court (Court) has pierced the corporate veil in Powers -v- Greymountain Management Ltd [In Liquidation] & Ors [2022] IEHC 599, to hold passive resident directors and non-resident shadow directors personally liable for funds lost to investors as a result of fraud.

The Facts

The High Court (Court) has appointed an inspector to investigate the affairs of a company following the first recorded application by a creditor, under Section 747 of the Companies Act 2014 (Act).

The Facts

The applicant, a creditor of WFS Forestry Ireland Limited (Company), and at least seventeen others, claimed that investments they made in the Company, in the form of loans and other advances, were not repaid when due.

A common yet contentious liability management strategy is an “uptier” transaction, where lenders holding a majority of loans or notes under a financing agreement seek to elevate or “roll-up” the priority of their debt above the previously pari passu debt held by the non-participating minority lenders. In a recent decision in the Boardriders case, the minority lenders defeated a motion to dismiss various claims challenging an uptier transaction.

In an important decision to private credit lenders, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a make-whole premium for an unsecured creditor tied to future interest payments is the “functional equivalent of unmatured interest” and not recoverable under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Ultra Petroleum Corp. v. Ad Hoc Committee of OpCo Unsecured Creditors (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.), No. 21-20008 (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (“Ultra”). Ordinarily, the story ends here.

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court finding, which granted a declaration under section 819 of the Companies Act 2014 (CA 2014), restricting the appellant director (Appellant) from acting as a director or secretary of a company for a period of five years, unless the company meets the requirements set out in subsection (3) of section 819.

Under Irish and UK law, company directors owe fiduciary duties to act in good faith in the interests of the company. The company's interests in this context usually means the collective best interests of the members. However, UK and Irish authorities have developed directors' common law duties, such that in cases of insolvency, directors have a duty to consider the interests of the company's creditors.

In a William Fry article published earlier this year, we discussed the Irish government's approval to opt-in to a regulation amending Annexes A and B to the European Insolvency Regulation 2015/848 (EIR Recast) regarding the recognition of insolvency processes recently introduced in other EU Member States.

Creditors of distressed businesses are often frustrated by shareholder-controlled boards when directors pursue strategies that appear to be designed to benefit shareholders at the creditors’ expense. In these circumstances, creditors might consider sending a letter to the board to convince the directors to pivot and adopt alternative strategies or face risk of liability for breaching fiduciary duties. The efficacy of this approach depends on many factors, including the company’s financial condition, the board’s composition and the underlying transactions at issue.

In a previous alert, we covered the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Stream TV Networks last year.