The High Court recently determined the extent to which a secured creditor must comply strictly with the formalities set out in a security instrument when executing a Deed of Appointment of a receiver. The Court ruled that strict compliance is required and that, in this case, this had not occurred.

Background

Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.

In the Matter of J.D. Brian Limited (In Liquidation) t/a East Coast Print and Publicity, In the Matter of J.D. Brian Motors Limited (In Liquidation) t/a Belgard Motors, In the Matter of East Coast Car Parts Limited (In Liquidation) and in the Matter of the Companies Acts 1963 - 2009

The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that a debtor can be adjudicated a bankrupt in Ireland and be subject to the Irish bankruptcy regime notwithstanding that the debtor has already been adjudicated a bankrupt in another jurisdiction, in this case the US.

Background

On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.

Currently before the Supreme Court is Baker Botts, L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C.,2 in which the Court will determine whether bankruptcy judges have discretion to award compensation for the defense of a fee application under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a). The decision in Baker Botts will likely resolve a circuit split and make clear whether a defense of a fee application is necessary to the administration of the case and, therefore, compensable.

On 20 May 2015 the European Parliament adopted a recast of the European Insolvency Regulation. The Recast Regulation is in line with the EU’s current political priorities of promoting economic recovery and boosting growth and employment. The key objectives of the Recast Regulation are to move away from the traditional liquidation approach towards more of a “second chance approach” for businesses and entrepreneurs in financial difficulties, and to enhance cooperation and coordination in cross-border insolvency proceedings. 

Scope

The High Court has found two former directors of a car dealership in Dublin, Appleyard Motors Limited (In Liquidation) (Appleyard), personally liable to a former customer who paid for but did not receive three vehicles in the weeks leading up to the company’s liquidation. This case is particularly noteworthy as it is only the second time a director has been held personally liable for a company’s debts for reckless trading.

Following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision last year in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, the filing of a proof of claim on a time-barred debt in a bankruptcy case pending in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (“FDCPA”). But as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama recently made clear in Gurganus v. Recovery Management Systems Corp. (In re Gurganus), No. 7:14-ap-70054-BGC, 2015 WL 65089 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Bullard v. Hyde Park Savings Bank (In re Bullard), U.S., No. 14-116 (cert. granted 12/12/14). The Court's decision in this case will resolve a circuit split with regard to whether an order denying confirmation of a bankruptcy plan is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The decision has the potential to impact Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 cases.