In a recent High Court case, a liquidator sought an order declaring that certain payments made by a company prior to its liquidation were a ‘fraudulent preference’ and invalid. The company had made payments to its overdrawn bank account which was personally guaranteed by one of its directors. It was alleged that the payments were made in order to reduce the company’s overdraft and therefore, the director’s own personal exposure under the guarantees.

Assenagon Asset Management S.A. v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited (formerly Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited) [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch)

The Court’s unanimous decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel LLC v. Amalgamated Banksettles dispute over the credit-bid right, retaining this important creditor protection.

The term “pre-pack”, as it relates to insolvency sales, can have different meanings in different jurisdictions. In essence it refers to a sale of a distressed company or asset where the purchaser or investor has been identified and the terms of the sale have been fully negotiated before an insolvency process occurs. The advantage to the “pre-pack” structure is that the sale can be completed immediately upon or closely after the appointment of the insolvency office holder and, critically, without material interruption to the trading activity of the target company or asset.

The Central Bank of Ireland (the “Central Bank”) has declared its intention to strengthen the protection of client assets and has now published its “Review of the Regulatory Regime for the Safeguarding of Client Assets” (the “Review”).

The Review identifies three main objectives which should form the basis of a client asset protection regime:

The usage of pre-pack insolvency sales is less developed in Ireland than in other jurisdictions, but there has been an increasing number of asset sales structured through pre-pack receiverships over the last year. The most recent successful example was the sale of the A-Wear retail chain by its receiver Jim Luby of McStay Luby. In July 2011 the Superquinn grocery chain was sold to Musgraves by its receivers Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG, in what was probably the largest ever pre-pack transaction in this market. 

Once a company has entered into a formal insolvency process, all its assets must be realised and distributed in accordance with the Companies Acts. An attempt to prefer a particular creditor up to two years prior to an insolvent liquidation can be declared void by the courts on the application of the liquidator of the insolvent company. To succeed on such an application, however, the liquidator must prove that the dominant intention of the insolvent company at the time it entered into the transaction was to prefer the creditor in question.

In Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ____ (June 23, 2011), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy court could not, as a constitutional matter, enter a final judgment on a counterclaim that did not arise under Title 11 or in a case under Title 11, even though 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) expressly permits it to do so. In a dispute concerning the estate of the late J. Howard Marshall II, Pierce Marshall filed a complaint in Vickie Lynn Marshall’s bankruptcy case alleging that Vickie defamed him and that such defamation claim was not dischargeable.

The New York Court of Appeals decision on April 5, in the Midland Insurance Company liquidation (In re Liquidation of Midland Insurance Company1) is an important affirmation of policyholder rights. In this decision, New York’s highest court held that a policyholder is entitled to a claim and policy-specific choice of law analysis in the liquidation process, rejecting the Midland liquidator’s effort to make a blanket application of New York law to Midland’s 38,000 policyholders.

According to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, a lack of bad faith is no longer a defense to court sanctions for failure to produce documents in a timely manner. That court, in In re A&M Florida Properties II, recently awarded sanctions against both a party and its counsel for the counsel’s failure to become familiar with the client’s email and data-retention policies and systems— despite the absence of any bad faith or willful delay.1