Should a claim for appraisal rights brought by a former shareholder of a Chapter 11 debtor be subordinated under Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code? According to the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the answer is yes. See In re: RTI Holding Co., LLC, No. 20-12456, 2021 WL 3409802 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 4, 2021).

Background

A key goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to prevent corporate insiders from profiting from their employer’s misfortune. Section 503(c) of the Code makes clear: “there shall neither be allowed, nor paid... a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's business” absent certain court-approved circumstances.

Trillions of dollars of securities are issued on the strength of bankruptcy remoteness and special purpose entities (“SPVs”) intended to be bankruptcy remote. These transactions generally involve hundreds of millions of dollars and investors’ expectations that the SPVs will not be dragged into a potential bankruptcy filing of their non-SPV affiliates.

Some courts permit debtors to designate vendors crucial to their business as “critical vendors.” These vendors supply debtors with necessary goods or services. Debtors are permitted to pay them amounts owing when a bankruptcy case is filed. Accordingly, critical vendors often recover more on their pre-petition claims than other unsecured creditors. In other words, critical vendors could receive a full recovery, while other creditors only receive a fraction of what they are owed.

The Bankruptcy Code grants the power to avoid certain transactions to a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547–48. Is there a general requirement that these avoidance powers only be used when doing so would benefit creditors? In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico addressed this question, concluding, in the face of a split of authority, that there was such a requirement.

In a recent opinion, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland dealt with a conflict between the strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and the Bankruptcy Code’s emphasis on centralization of claims. Based on an analysis of the two statutory schemes and their underlying policies and concerns, the Court decided to lift the automatic stay to allow the prepetition arbitration proceeding to go forward with respect to non-core claims.

Background

A recent case before bankruptcy judge Karen B. Owens of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Dura Auto. Sys., LLC, No. 19-12378 (KBO), 2021 WL 2456944 (Bankr. D. Del. June 16, 2021), provides a cautionary reminder that the Third Circuit does not recognize the doctrine of implied assumption (i.e., assumptions implied through a course of conduct as opposed to those that are assumed pursuant to a motion and court order).

On 28 June 2021, the English High Court handed down a judgment declining to sanction a restructuring plan proposed by Hurricane Energy PLC, which sought to cram down the dissenting class of shareholders and hand over the control of the company to its bondholders with a debt-for-equity swap diluting the shareholders down to 5% of their existing shareholding. This is the first time that the English court has declined to sanction a restructuring plan (since their introduction almost a year ago in June 2020), and only the fourth time that the cross-class cram down mechanism has been used.

As we reported, on June 21, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to revisit the rigid Brunner standard for determining “undue hardship” capable of discharging student debt. The same day, United States Bankruptcy Judge Michelle M.

On Monday, the United States Supreme Court denied Thelma McCoy’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, passing up a golden opportunity to bring uniformity to the “important and recurring question” of how to determine the sort of “undue hardship” that qualifies a debtor for a discharge of student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).