Yesterday, in Mission Product Holdings v. Tempnology LLC, the Supreme Court held that a trademark licensee may continue using a licensed trademark after its licensor files for bankruptcy and rejects the relevant license agreement. While a debtor-licensor may "reject" a trademark license agreement under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, such rejection is only a breach of the agreement and does not allow the licensor to revoke the licensee's rights.
Creditors’ recoveries often hinge on claw-back lawsuits that trustees bring under bankruptcy law and non-bankruptcy law.[1] Trustees can file claims based on non-bankruptcy law because Bankruptcy Code section 544(b) allows them to assert claims that creditors have standing to file outside of bankruptcy.
On March 27, 2019, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Virginia issued an opinion holding that an over-secured creditor could not recover a portion of the creditor's attorney's fees incurred in connection with the borrower's bankruptcy proceeding despite provisions in the loan agreement that provided for recovery of attorney's fees "incurred in connection with the enforcement" of the loan documents.
When we last checked in on the Puerto Rico restructuring case, we reported on the February 15 decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals that the members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board were appointed in contravention of the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution because they were never confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
New York and Delaware courts resolved two coverage issues in favor of directors and officers of real estate investment trust advisory companies in lawsuits against their liability insurers. Both decisions arise out of ongoing coverage disputes related to allegations of fraud and other wrongdoing in connection with accounting irregularities.
Two weeks ago, we discussed asset sales under Bankruptcy Code section 363. As that post noted, section 363 requires court approval for asset sales outside the ordinary course of business, with courts ensuring that sales reflect a reasonable business judgment and have an articulated business justification. Debtors may choose to sell assets via a public auction or through a private sale.
The subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts causes confusion and can be hard to understand. In a recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit clarified the meaning of the phrase “related to” in 28 U.S.C. §1334(b), the federal statute that governs the subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts.[1]
We now address assets sales under Bankruptcy Code section 363. The statute allows debtors to use, sell, or lease their property in the ordinary course of business without court permission. But a debtor’s use, sale, or lease of property outside the ordinary course of business requires court approval. And courts will usually approve a debtor’s disposition of property if it reflects the debtor’s reasonable business judgment and an articulated business justification.
It always amazes me when, after more than a half-century of Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) jurisprudence, an issue one thinks would arise quite commonly appears never to have been decided in a reported case. Such an issue was recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an adversary proceeding in the Pettit Oil Co. Chapter 7 case.[1]
Ruling from the bench on April 4, Bankruptcy Judge Alan Koschik of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied approval of a disclosure statement proposed by FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. because the plan it described was “patently unconfirmable.”[1]