We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

On July 2, 2024, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (the “Court”) released its highly anticipated decision in British Columbia v. Peakhill Capital Inc., 2024 BCCA 246 (“Peakhill”) concerning the use of reverse vesting orders (“RVOs”) to effect sale transactions structured to avoid provincial property transfer taxes for the benefit of creditors.

On June 27, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a 5-4 decision rejecting the nonconsensual releases of the Sackler family in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy case. The split is an interesting alignment of Justices: Gorsuch writing the majority opinion, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett and Jackson; Kavanaugh for the dissent, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor and Kagan.

Many litigators and corporate lawyers view the practice of representing a large shareholder and the company in which it is invested as common practice. In many instances, no conflict of interest will ever materialize such that the shareholder and the company require separate representation. However, in a recent opinion rendered by the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia (the “Court”), a large international law firm (the “Firm”) was disqualified from representing Enviva Inc.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy has long been thought of as anathema to commercial real estate (CRE) lenders. This is due to the debtor-friendly bankruptcy forum, particularly with respect to (i) the up to 18 month exclusivity period during which only the debtor could propose a plan of reorganization and (ii) threats of a "cram-down" plan used to lever concessions from lenders. These provisions can be, and often were, abused by debtors with no real rehabilitative intent using bankruptcy only as a leverage tool.

This article originally appeared in The Bankruptcy Strategist.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. §109(a). In cross border Chapter 15 cases, courts have considered if a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343

On May 6, 2024, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment motion decision in favour of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD Bank”) in 2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343.^[1]

At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). In cross border chapter 15 cases, courts have considered whether a representative of a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.