We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.

On June 27, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a 5-4 decision rejecting the nonconsensual releases of the Sackler family in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy case. The split is an interesting alignment of Justices: Gorsuch writing the majority opinion, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett and Jackson; Kavanaugh for the dissent, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor and Kagan.

The US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 5-4 decision on June 27, 2024 that nonconsensual third-party releases, as proposed in Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan, were not permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. A nonconsensual third-party release serves to eliminate the direct claims of third parties against nondebtor parties without soliciting the consent of such affected claimants. This contrasts with consensual releases and opt-in or opt-out mechanisms permitted by courts.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy has long been thought of as anathema to commercial real estate (CRE) lenders. This is due to the debtor-friendly bankruptcy forum, particularly with respect to (i) the up to 18 month exclusivity period during which only the debtor could propose a plan of reorganization and (ii) threats of a "cram-down" plan used to lever concessions from lenders. These provisions can be, and often were, abused by debtors with no real rehabilitative intent using bankruptcy only as a leverage tool.

This article originally appeared in The Bankruptcy Strategist.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. §109(a). In cross border Chapter 15 cases, courts have considered if a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). In cross border chapter 15 cases, courts have considered whether a representative of a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.