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A bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid and recover pre-bankruptcy preferential transfers is essential to preserving or augmenting the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. In 2019, however, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to add a due diligence requirement to the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance provision, apparently as a way to minimize the volume of speculative and coercive preference litigation.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.

In In re Golden Sphinx Ltd., 2023 WL 2823391 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California denied a motion filed by a creditor of a chapter 15 debtor seeking discovery from a bank that had provided financing to one of the debtor's affiliates.

There is longstanding controversy concerning the validity of third-party release provisions in non-asbestos trust chapter 11 plans that limit the potential exposure of various non-debtor parties involved in the process of negotiating, implementing and funding a plan. In the latest chapter of this debate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a long-awaited ruling regarding the validity of nonconsensual third-party releases in the chapter 11 plan of pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, "Purdue").

Subchapter V eligibility requires a debtor to be “engaged in” commercial/business activities.

Case Law Consensus

Case law consensus is that such activities must exist on the petition filing date. That means a debtor cannot utilize Subchapter V when:

  • business assets are fully-liquidated;
  • unpaid debts are the only remnant of the failed business; and
  • prospects for resuming such activities are nil.

So . . . here’s the question: Is that the right eligibility standard?

I say, “No.”

A Hypothetical

Contrasting opinions from any court, issued a month apart, are always instructive.

And we have a new such thing—from the U.S. Supreme Court, no less, and from May and June of this year. The contrast is on this subject: whether sovereign immunities of Puerto Rico and of a federally recognized tribe are abrogated in bankruptcy.

Were Congress to . . . intervene and expand § 524(g) beyond asbestos cases, bankruptcy would become a more suitable alternative for resolving mass tort cases. Until then, such cases will likely remain problematic under the Code in the face of creditor opposition.

Subchapter V of the Bankruptcy Code’s Chapter 11 is relatively new: it took effect as a new law on February 19, 2020. Accordingly, new questions continue to arise on how its terms and provisions should be applied.

A Trustee Fees Question

One Subchapter V question is this:

  • When does a Subchapter V trustee’s administrative claim for fees and costs get paid?

A Regular Chapter 11 Answer

The answer in regular Chapter 11 has always been this:

When a federal court approves a [bankruptcy] plan allowing someone to put its hands into another person’s pockets, the person with the pockets is entitled to be fully heard and to have legitimate objections addressed.[Fn. 1]

Pop Quiz Question:

Does Insurer, in the following facts, have standing to object to Debtor’s Chapter 11 plan?

Debtor is in bankruptcy because of asbestos lawsuits.

Debtor proposes a Chapter 11 plan that is supported by all constituencies—except one:

Exculpation clauses limiting the liability of certain entities for actions taken in connection with a bankruptcy case are a common feature of chapter 11 plans. However, courts disagree over the permitted scope of such clauses. They also disagree as to whether an order confirming a chapter 11 plan that includes exculpation and third-party release provisions is insulated from appellate review under the doctrine of "equitable mootness."