R (on the application of Palmer) (Appellant) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court and another (Respondents) [2023] UKSC 38

On appeal from: [2021] EWHC 3013

A powerful tool afforded to a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") is the power to recover pre-bankruptcy transfers that are avoidable under federal bankruptcy law (or sometimes state law) because they were either made with the intent to defraud creditors or are constructively fraudulent because the debtor-transferor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange and was insolvent at the time, or was rendered insolvent as a consequence of the transfer.

The scope of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" shielding certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers has long been a magnet for controversy, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court suggested (but did not hold) in Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct.

Debtors in non-U.S. bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings commonly seek to shield their U.S. assets from creditor collection efforts by seeking "recognition" of those proceedings in the United States in a case under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. If a U.S. bankruptcy court recognizes the debtor's foreign proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay prevents creditor collection efforts, including the commencement or continuation of any U.S. litigation involving the debtor or its U.S. assets. A U.S.

In a 2021 ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived nearly 100 lawsuits seeking to recover fraudulent transfers made as part of the Madoff Ponzi scheme. In one of the latest chapters in that resurrected litigation, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held in Picard v. ABN AMRO Bank NV (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC), 654 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

One year ago, we wrote that 2022 would be remembered in the corporate bankruptcy world for the "crypto winter" that descended in November 2022 with the spectacular collapse of FTX Trading Ltd., Alameda Research, and approximately 130 other affiliated companies that ignited the meltdown of many other platforms, exchanges, lenders, and mining operations because they did business with FTX.

Because bankruptcy courts were created by Congress rather than under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, there is a disagreement over whether bankruptcy courts, like other federal courts, have "inherent authority" to impose sanctions for civil contempt on parties that refuse to comply with their orders. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revisited this debate in In re Markus, 78 F.4th 554 (2nd Cir. 2023).

There have been many reported cases in the bankruptcies of Mr and Mrs Brake (the “Brakes”) including the recent case of Patley Wood Farm LLP v Kicks [2023] EWCA Civ 901 where the Court of Appeal considered an application under s303 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “IA 1986”) against a decision of the trustees in bankruptcy of the Brakes (the “Trustees”).

The Supreme Court’s judgment in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA and ors^[1] (“Sequana”) is a key decision on the law surrounding directors’ duties.

The High Court was required to consider the Supreme Court’s Sequana judgment in Hunt v Singh (below).

What did we learn from Sequana?

Why calculating potential claims under s214 Insolvency Act 1986 can be far from simple

Introduction