The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut recently examined a question at the heart of an existing circuit split regarding the consequences of trademark license rejection in bankruptcy: can a trademark licensee retain the use of a licensed trademark post-rejection? In re SIMA International, Inc., 2018 WL 2293705 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018).

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

On January 15, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) held in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts that section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed the order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.) approving a settlement and dismissal of a chapter 11 case by way of a “structured dismissal.” A structured dismissal is, simply, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case preceded by other orders, such as an order approving a settlement or granting releases, which survive dismissal of the case.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissing the appeal of chapter 13 debtor Luis Bullard for lack of jurisdiction.1 The Court held that the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying confirmation of Bullard’s proposed chapter 13 plan was not a final order from which Bullard could immediately appeal as of right.2 The Court reasoned that, while confirmation of a plan can be said to fix the rights and obligations of the parties in a way that alters the status quo, d