When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).
Banks regularly enter into commercial relationships with their customers such as opening new depository accounts. These relationships are often contractual in nature and seem relatively straightforward until an unexpected incident occurs that causes the relationship to unravel. What then are the duties owed by each party to each another? The default rule seems to be that the terms and conditions that the parties agreed to at first govern the parties’ actions throughout their banking relationship.
The term “golden shares” is often referred to equity interests held by a specific party—commonly a lender or investor—that authorize such party to block or prevent a corporate entity from filing bankruptcy. Such shares are often negotiated by a party that wants to ensure that its consent is obtained before any bankruptcy is commenced. Without such consent, the party holding the golden shares can seek to dismiss to a corporate bankruptcy filing by based on a lack of corporate authority.
The Bankruptcy Code often instructs a trustee or debtor to perform an act or make an election within a certain time. Sometimes the relevant provisions are intended to benefit a party in interest who is affected by a debtor’s or trustee’s action or election. Unfortunately, some of the provisions that prescribe a trustee or debtor to act fail to provide a remedy to the affected party in interest in the event the trustee or debtor does not act in compliance with the Code.
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.
On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta
On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.
In In re Hungry Horse, LLC, Adversary Proceeding No. 16-11222 (Bankr. D. N.M. September 20, 2017) (“Hungry Horse”), the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court reminded us that many U.S. Supreme Court opinions can be limited in scope and do not necessarily dispose of all potential remedies to an issue.
In In re NewPage Corporation, et al., Adversary Proceeding No. 13-52429 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 13, 2017), a Delaware Bankruptcy Court applied a unique defense to certain preferential transfers targeted by a liquidating trustee. The defense focuses on a commonly overlooked element of a preferential transfer, section 547(b)(5).
Preference 101