On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

The Alberta Court of Appeal has dismissed the appeal brought by the Alberta Energy Regulator and the Orphan Well Association from the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta in Re Redwater Energy Corporation. A majority of the panel held that the provisions of the provincial legislation governing certain actions of licensees of oil and gas assets do not apply to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent companies, given the paramountcy of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act over provincial legislation where the governing provisions conflict.

When a lender makes an interest bearing loan to a borrower for a fixed term, the contract may provide that the borrower cannot repay the principal sum before maturity. This is often referred to as a “no call” provision. The intent of this provision is to protect the lender’s expected return on its investment during the term of the contract. Otherwise, the lender could be faced with the loss of interest payments that the borrower would have otherwise paid to the lender.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi

As discussed in our May 2016 bulletin, New Rules for Asset Sales by Insolvent Producers (at least for now), the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta in Re Redwater Energy Corporation, 2016 ABQB 278 ("Redwater") determined that provisions of the provincial legislation governing the actions of licensees of oil and gas assets did not apply to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent companies, given the paramountcy of the Bank

In Alberta, regulations have historically prohibited purchasers of oil and gas assets from cherry picking operating interests in economic properties while leaving behind interests in uneconomic wells. This has had a significant negative impact on the ability of a receiver or trustee to market and sell assets owned by insolvent companies and on the prices those assets are able to attract.