In a decision further defining when US public policy restricts the relief a court may grant in aid of a foreign restructuring or insolvency proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 15 case of Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V.), Ch. 15 Case No. 11-33335-HDH-15, 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jun. 13, 2012) refused to a enforce a Mexican restructuring plan that novated and extinguished the guaranty obligations of the Mexican debtor’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors.

Whether a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid at a sale under a chapter 11 plan has been the subject of conflicting decisions rendered by the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits.¹ The United States Supreme Court has resolved these inconsistent rulings with its decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al., v. Amalgamated Bank, ² which affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that a secured creditor has an absolute right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan.

Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a worldwide estate comprising all of the legal or equitable interests of the debtor, “wherever located,” held by the debtor as of the filing date.¹ The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, in turn, applies “to all entities” and protects the debtor’s property and the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction by barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate . . .

The recent flurry of news reports regarding the administration of high street retail chains and the subsequent sale of parts of their businesses is perhaps an opportune time to flag up the renewed importance that the hypothec plays in Scottish property law.

By virtue of the hypothec, in insolvency, a landlord automatically obtains a fixed charge ranking on the proceeds of sale of the moveable goods of the tenant that are on the premises as at the point of insolvency, up to the value of any arrears of rent.

Agreements with administrators often contain provisions to the effect that any claim against the company in administration will rank only as an unsecured claim and not as an expense of the administration. Although such provisions are common, there has always been some doubt as to their efficacy.

Recently, the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's decision in the Nortel Networks and Lehman Brothers disputes. The judgment confirms that liabilities under Financial Support Directions (FSDs) and Contribution Notices (CNs), which are issued by the Pensions Regulator, will rank ahead of almost all other claims when a company becomes insolvent. The discussions in the case focused on whether FSDs and CNs are classed as 'provable debts', expenses of the insolvency or, indeed, neither.

In Finnerty v Clark, the Court of Appeal has given guidance on what constitutes "good and sufficient" grounds for the removal of administrators. In this case, shareholders of a company in administration were also substantial creditors of the company. They wished the administrators to raise proceedings under Section 244 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (extortionate credit transactions) to challenge loan agreements that had been entered into by the company prior to administration.

The recent case of Stephen Petitioner offers some clarification regarding issues relating to the validity of appointment of administrators.

The Facts

Sections 216 and 217 of the Insolvency Act impose draconian sanctions on directors of liquidated companies who reuse "prohibited names". Prohibited names are names that are identical to, or "suggest an association with", a company that has gone into liquidation and of which they were previously directors. The sanctions include criminal penalties and personal liability for debts. It has always been difficult for advisers to confidently advise directors whether a proposed name for a new company would be a prohibited name, given the vague nature of the phrase "suggest an association".

On September 2, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a holding by the Court of Chancery that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies do not have standing to sue derivatively. This contrasts with Delaware corporations: the Delaware courts have recognized that when a corporation becomes insolvent, creditors become the residual risk-bearers and are permitted to sue derivatively on behalf of a corporation to the same extent as stockholders.