Consider the common commercial loan collection situation: a business debt collateralized by relatively permanent collateral (real property or durable non-mobile equipment such as a printing press) and transient collateral (inventory, accounts receivable and cash).[1] Frequently, there is also potentially recoverable unsecured debt because the collateral is insufficient to pay the entire debt and (a) the collateral does not include all the borrower’s

A lawyer’s usual task is to help solve the client’s current problem: resolve a dispute; close a loan; obtain a permit; avoid a conviction; etc. Lawyers are so task oriented that some consultants advise us to have task specific engagement understandings and send dis-engagement letters when a task is complete. For bankruptcy lawyers representing individuals in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the task at hand is getting clients to and through a confirmed Chapter 13 plan with the promised debt relief and fresh start.

On June 20, 2018, Judge Kevin J. Carey of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware sustained an objection to a proof of claim filed by a postpetition debt purchaser premised on anti-assignment clauses contained in transferred promissory notes. In re Woodbridge Group of Companies, LLC, et al., No. 17-12560, at *14 (jointly administered) (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 20, 2018).

Lawyers representing creditors often compete with federal government claims against the same insolvent borrower/debtor. There are several common federal statutes that impact these disputes including: 11 U.S.C. Section 507[1]; 26 U.S.C. Section 6321[2], et seq.; and 31 U.S.C.

Summary

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut recently examined a question at the heart of an existing circuit split regarding the consequences of trademark license rejection in bankruptcy: can a trademark licensee retain the use of a licensed trademark post-rejection? In re SIMA International, Inc., 2018 WL 2293705 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018).

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).