On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

The Alberta Court of Appeal has dismissed the appeal brought by the Alberta Energy Regulator and the Orphan Well Association from the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta in Re Redwater Energy Corporation. A majority of the panel held that the provisions of the provincial legislation governing certain actions of licensees of oil and gas assets do not apply to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent companies, given the paramountcy of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act over provincial legislation where the governing provisions conflict.

When a lender makes an interest bearing loan to a borrower for a fixed term, the contract may provide that the borrower cannot repay the principal sum before maturity. This is often referred to as a “no call” provision. The intent of this provision is to protect the lender’s expected return on its investment during the term of the contract. Otherwise, the lender could be faced with the loss of interest payments that the borrower would have otherwise paid to the lender.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

As discussed in our May 2016 bulletin, New Rules for Asset Sales by Insolvent Producers (at least for now), the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta in Re Redwater Energy Corporation, 2016 ABQB 278 ("Redwater") determined that provisions of the provincial legislation governing the actions of licensees of oil and gas assets did not apply to receivers and trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent companies, given the paramountcy of the Bank

In Alberta, regulations have historically prohibited purchasers of oil and gas assets from cherry picking operating interests in economic properties while leaving behind interests in uneconomic wells. This has had a significant negative impact on the ability of a receiver or trustee to market and sell assets owned by insolvent companies and on the prices those assets are able to attract.

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. ^[1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

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