The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.
Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.
The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.
In March of this year, consumer electronics and home appliance retailer Gregg Appliances, Inc., better known as H.H. Gregg, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Indianapolis, Indiana. H.H. Gregg, which took over many of the retail spaces previously occupied by Circuit City, is one of many big-box retailers that have sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the past several years. Like Circuit City, H.H. Gregg was unsuccessful in reorganizing in bankruptcy and is now seeking to recover payments made to vendors and other creditors within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Major changes to bankruptcy rules that govern the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases, and Chapter 13 cases in particular, were recently approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress.1 After several years of drafting and debate by the rules committee, these rule amendments will become effective December 1, 2017.
On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
Earlier this month, teen clothing retailer Aéropostale filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, seeking to immediately close 154 of its over 800 stores located throughout the United States and Canada. Many of these stores are located in smaller shopping malls, which have been hit the hardest by the shift to online shopping.
The continued march of retail bankruptcies since 2015 includes Sports Authority, Vestis Retail Group, Inc. (the operator of Sports Chalet, Eastern Mountain Sports, and Bob’s Stores), Radio Shack, American Apparel, Quicksilver, Wet Seal, Delia’s and PacSun.
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.