The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:

• abusive behavior;
• bad faith conduct;
• a means for swindling creditors;
• the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
• a tool for avoiding liability;
• etc., etc.

Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”

Here’s a dilemma:

• Should bankruptcy be available as a tool for resolving mass tort cases of all types (like it already is in asbestos contexts)?

Here’s an illustration of the dilemma:

• many tort claimants in the Johnson & Johnson case DO NOT want bankruptcy involved; but
• many tort claimants in the Purdue Pharma case were BEGGING the courts to approve the bankruptcy plan.

How do we solve this dilemma?

How can creditors reduce the risk of a fixed charge being characterised as floating?

The determination as to whether a charge over a valuable asset is fixed or floating can be crucial to a creditor's recovery in an insolvency. To have two cases over the course of little more than a year providing detailed analysis of the nature of fixed and floating charges is indeed a treat. Are there any practical steps creditors can take to reduce the risk of a fixed charge being characterised as floating?

Fluctuating assets?

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion is Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., Case No. 22-1079, Decided June 6, 2024.

Opinion’s Q & A

The Truck Insurance question is this:

• Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” under § 1109(b)?

The Supreme Court’s answer is this:

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the eighth in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

• whether the Subchapter V trustee or other party in interest should be allowed to file a plan after debtor’s removal from possession.[Fn. 1]

Recommendation

We have a direct statutory conflict:

• one statute requires an ERISA dispute to be resolved in arbitration; but
• a bankruptcy statute requires the same dispute to be resolved in bankruptcy.

Which statute should prevail? The bankruptcy statute, of course.

• That’s the conclusion of In re Yellow Corp.[Fn. 1]

Statutory Conflict

The In re Yellow Corp. case presents a direct conflict between these two federal statutes (emphases added):

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the seventh in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

• whether the $7,500,000 debt cap for Subchapter V eligibility should remain or revert to an interest-adjusted $3,024,725.

Recommendation

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the sixth in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

• whether a Subchapter V trustee should act as a mediator.[Fn. 1]

Recommendation

“Subchapter V relieves small business debtors from the absolute priority rule.”[Fn. 1]

• This was the excuse for a contorted grammatical interpretation, against the debtor, of a Subchapter V statute by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals gives the same excuse for the same contorted grammatical interpretation — like this:

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the fourth in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is: