The automatic stay provided under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code is an injunction, arising when a bankruptcy case is filed, which prevents all proceedings or actions against the debtor or the property of the estate without court permission - the so-called “lifting of the stay”.[1]

In American jurisprudence, resolution of disputes often involves the use of important tools to obtain information necessary to achieving a client’s goals. These tools are collectively known as “discovery.” Discovery is most often used in litigation; however, it may also be used as part of the bankruptcy process, without the need for a pending lawsuit.

The imperative “justice, justice shall you pursue” is nowhere better illustrated than in the application of deadlines to perform an act, including filing dates, limitations dates, due dates for filing appeals, and deadlines for filing claims. Courts sometimes exercise their equitable jurisdiction rather than follow the literal language of rules of procedure.

When a debtor files bankruptcy, bankruptcy attorneys and creditors are well aware of the importance of assessing the need for creditors to file proofs of claim and making sure that proofs of claim are timely filed.

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).

2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.