Further to our previous article, which can be found here, we consider the key issues with which the Court faced, the technical legal analysis underpinning this judgment and our view on what this may mean for energy suppliers, and the sector as a whole, looking forward.

Background - what was the application and why was it needed?

In a recent decision in the Admiralty Court before Mr Admiralty Registrar Davison, the Court considered the application of the recently enacted section 233B of the Insolvency Act 1986. Whilst the conclusions reached on that provision are perhaps less surprising given its wide remit, the decision raises some interesting points for contract lawyers on the formation of contracts and the reasonableness of their terms.

Introduction – Section 233B of the Insolvency Act 1986 (Act)

Following the Government's announcement in March that the hotly anticipated changes to the UK's insolvency regime would be rushed through Parliament with further, temporary, provisions to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, insolvency practitioners and business professionals alike have been awaiting further clarity on what the Business Secretary's comments mean for businesses both in the current climate and more generally.

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).

2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.