Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Disagreement regarding the interpretation of section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code has led to divergent rulings among the bankruptcy and federal circuit courts regarding whether a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor can assume an executory contract or unexpired lease that is unassignable under applicable non-bankruptcy law without the counterparty's consent—even where the debtor has no intention of assigning the agreement to a third party.

The Bankruptcy Code provides that, in chapter 11 cases where the court does not find "cause" for the appointment of a trustee, the court "shall" appoint an examiner, upon a request from the Office of the U.S. Trustee (the "UST") or any party-in-interest prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. The examiner's role is to investigate the debtor's affairs or allegations of management misconduct, if either: (i) the court determines that the appointment would be in the best interests of stakeholders and the estate; or (ii) the debtor has qualifying unsecured debt exceeding $5 million.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

Section 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code gives chapter 11 debtors a valuable tool for use in situations where long-term prepetition debt carries a significantly lower interest rate than the rates available at the time of emergence from bankruptcy. Under this section, in a chapter 11 plan, the debtor can "cure" any defaults under the relevant agreement and "reinstate" the maturity date and other terms of the original agreement, thus enabling the debtor to "lock in" a favorable interest rate in a prepetition loan agreement upon bankruptcy emergence.

On June 6, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed the chapter 11 plan of bedding manufacturer Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC and its affiliates (collectively, "Serta"). In confirming Serta's plan, the court held that a 2020 "uptier," or "position enhancement," transaction (the "2020 Transaction") whereby Serta issued new debt secured by a priming lien on its assets and purchased its existing debt from participating lenders at a discount with a portion of the proceeds did not violate the terms of Serta's 2016 credit agreement.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.

Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the reversal or modification of an order approving a sale or lease of assets in bankruptcy does not affect the validity of the sale or lease to a good-faith purchaser or lessee unless the party challenging the sale or lease obtains a stay pending its appeal of the order.

简介

最近在Re Guy Kwok-Hung Lam [2023] HKCFA 9一案中，香港终审法院澄清，如果受争议的呈请债务所涉及的协议载有专属司法管辖权条款（「专属条款」），法院应如何处理清盘及破产呈请。

案情

上诉人于2017年与CP Global Inc（「该公司」）及答辩人订立了一份信贷及担保协议（「信贷协议」）。据此，上诉人向该公司提供定期贷款，答辩人就该公司结欠上诉人的所有款项提供个人担保。信贷协议载有专属条款，就该协议所产生或与之有关的所有法律程序赋予纽约法院专属司法管辖权。

于2020年，上诉人认为发生了信贷协议所指的违约事件，故要求答辩人支付信贷协议项下的未偿还本金及利息。答辩人未有按上诉人的要求还款，因此上诉人在香港针对答辩人展开破产法律程序。另一方面，答辩人在纽约提起诉讼，请求法院求宣告并无发生信贷协议下的违约事件。

答辩人反对在香港提出破产呈请的主要理由之一，是专属条款规定上诉人须首先在纽约法院就双方争议进行诉讼，然后才可在香港展开破产程序。

Introduction

In the latest judgment handed down by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Re Guy Kwok-Hung Lam [2023] HKCFA 9, the Court of Final Appeal clarified the approach to winding up and bankruptcy petitions where the agreement from which the disputed petition debt arose contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause (“EJC”).

Facts