The world is getting smaller. The number of people who hop from country to country throughout their lives is increasing. Inevitably, when a jet-setting life becomes financially troubled, bankruptcy and other court proceedings are likely to be similarly international. Two cases involving the same parties were heard in both the High Court in London and the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. See Kemsley v Barclays Bank Plc & Ors [2013] EWHC 1274 (Ch) (15 May 2013), 2013 WL 1904308, and In re Kemsley, 489 B.R. 346 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).
2012 is shaping up as a year of bankruptcy first impressions for the Ninth Circuit. The court of appeals sailed into uncharted bankruptcy waters twice already this year in the same chapter 11 case. On January 24, the court ruled in In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 2012 WL 178998 (9th Cir. Jan. 24, 2012) ("Thorpe I"), that an appeal by certain nonsettling asbestos insurers of an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not equitably moot because, among other things, the plan had not been "substantially consummated" under the court's novel construction of that statutory term.
There is something positively Dickensian when looking at the anti-deprivation rule (the "rule") and images come up of scribes working in dark and dismal rooms scratching their quills by dim candle light. Indeed, the rule dates back to the nineteenth century and many lawyers would be hard-pressed to explain it even if they are able to grasp the contradictions and fine distinctions thrown up by the old cases. In essence, the rule provides that a contractual provision is void if it provides for the transfer of an asset from the owner to a third party upon the insolvency of the owner.