The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.

Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.

The ability to sell an asset in bankruptcy free and clear of liens and any other competing “interest” is a well-recognized tool available to a trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”). Whether the category of “interests” encompassed by that power extends to potential successor liability claims, however, has been the subject of considerable debate in the courts. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this controversial issue in Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).

InJ.D. Brian Ltd (in liquidation) & Others the High Court held that, where a floating charge crystallised prior to the commencement of a winding-up, the preferential creditors still had priority pursuant to in section 285 of the Companies Act 1963 over the holder of what had become a fixed charge.

The English court of appeal has held that a company should not be held to be balance sheet insolvent on the sole basis that its liabilities (including contingent and prospective liabilities) exceed its assets.

In BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail & Ors, the Court of Appeal considered in detail, for the first time, the construction of section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, which sets out circumstances in which a company can be deemed to be unable to pay its debts.

The relevant portions of section 123 provide as follows:

In Re: Michael McLoughlin Pharmacy Ltd. The examiner sought the High Court’s approval for a scheme of arrangement which limited his liability for negligence. The secured creditor objected as a matter of principle because such limitations of liability had become commonplace in schemes. The secured creditor made it clear that there was no suggestion of any negligence by the examiner in the particular case.

The court considered:

InDellway and Ors. v National Asset Management Agency & Ors., a number of companies and Paddy McKillen appealed a decision of the High Court in relation to the purported acquisition of €2∙1 billion in loans to the appellant companies by NAMA.

The appeal was brought on five grounds:

In Re McInerney Homes Limited

In the McInerney case, the company and the examiner sought to have schemes confirmed which would result in an immediate payment to a banking syndicate of €25 million. The banking syndicate contended that the discounted current value which they expected to recover from their security outside any schemes was €50 million.

Kerr & Ors v Conduit Enterprises Ltd

In 1997 the two directors of the company and others purchased a building and leased it to the company. Ownership of the company changed hands a number of times and, in 2008, the then new owners purported to void the lease on the basis that it had never been approved by shareholder resolution. The landlords issued proceedings seeking a declaration that the lease was valid.

The court held that:

In a series of cases the High Court has:

In January 2010 an interim examiner was appointed to Missford Limited, which operated the Residence Club, a private members club in St. Stephen’s Green.

In a written judgment on the costs and expenses of the interim examiner, the court held that the interim examiner “simply did more with the best of motives than his warrant permitted”. The court proceeded to refuse the interim examiner’s application for remuneration in respect of any work carried out in excess of his statutory powers.