This is the second litigation involving the furlough scheme in the insolvency context, following on from Re Carluccio's (in administration). Please refer to our note on Carluccio's for background reading on how the furlough scheme weaves into insolvency law.

Issue

In the first litigation involving the Furlough scheme, the court in Re Carluccio's (in administration) ruled on how the administrators can lawfully give effect to furlough arrangements with the employees who have agreed to the variation of their employment contract.

Read on for our analysis of the case which gives an interesting insight into how the courts in the future might interpret the furlough scheme.

1. Background

Carluccio’s in administration

Courts and professionals have wrestled for years with the appropriate approach to use in setting the interest rate when a debtor imposes a chapter 11 plan on a secured creditor and pays the creditor the value of its collateral through deferred payments under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the Bankruptcy Code. Secured lenders gained a major victory on October 20, 2017, when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a market rate of interest is preferred to a so-called “formula approach” in chapter 11, when an efficient market exists.

Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to interpret ambiguous, imprecise, and otherwise puzzling language in the Bankruptcy Code, including the phrases “claim,” “interest in property,” “ordinary course of business,” “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” “allowed secured claim,” “willful and malicious injury,” “on account of,” “value, as of the effective date of the plan,” “projected disposable income,” “defalcation,” and “retirement funds.” The interpretive principles employed by the Court in interpreting the peculiarities of the Bankruptcy Code were in full view when the Court r

The absolute priority rule of Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is a fundamental creditor protection in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. In general terms, the rule provides that if a class of unsecured creditors rejects a debtor’s reorganization plan and is not paid in full, junior creditors and equity interestholders may not receive or retain any property under the plan. The rule thus implements the general state-law principle that creditors are entitled to payment before shareholders, unless creditors agree to a different result.