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过去数年,打包重组(Repackaging)结构盛行,中资金融机构寻求使用其作为便利进入市场的工具,并为客户提供创新的融资方案。

中国房地产行业是最广泛使用该结构的行业之一,该行业在2021年高开低走、大起大跌,并于最后一季急挫。市场预期房地产行业在2022年仍将困难重重。

在此背景下,我们察觉到安排人(Arranger)、中国房地产企业及投资者正在寻求对现有的打包重组交易进行结构调整(restructure)的机会(包括提前终止、展期、增加额外增信措施、置换等安排)。此外,我们还观察到,市场对与中国非房地产行业主体(如融资租赁公司、金融科技公司)相关的资产支持交易的兴趣有所增加。

我们将于本文探讨部分有关修订或提前终止打包重组交易的主要问题,并且概述我们在市场中观察到的典型案例和未来趋势。

温故知新:打包重组交易的基本结构

许多较为简单的打包重组交易的结构一般具有下列特点:

The Bankruptcy Code prevents an individual debtor from discharging certain debts, including, upon request of the creditor, debts for “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). The Seventh Circuit recently confirmed in Stoughton Lumber Co., Inc. v. Sveum, No.

The Bankruptcy Code exempts from discharge those debts arising from willful and malicious injuries caused by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Because debtors have a habit of filing bankruptcy soon after a judgment for such an injury is entered against them, bankruptcy courts often give a prior (state or federal) judgment issue-preclusive effect when the creditor seeks to have the debt declared non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6).