Tolstoy warned that “if you look for perfection, you’ll never be content”; but Tolstoy wasn’t a bankruptcy lawyer. In the world of secured lending, perfection is paramount. A secured lender that has not properly perfected its lien can lose its collateral and end up with unsecured status if its borrower files bankruptcy.

On appeal from a decision in the In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. bankruptcy case, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that contractual make-whole premium provisions are enforceable where the obligation to repay bond debt is accelerated by a bankruptcy filing.

In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.

While secured creditors are entitled to special rights in bankruptcy, those rights may differ depending on whether creditors have a statutory or consensual lien on their collateral. This is primarily because section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that “property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement . . .

It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement.  However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

Much has been written in the past several years regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). Now, the Supreme Court has weighed in again in the case of Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., et al v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ___ (2015) in an attempt to clarify the confusion created by Stern.

A recent Delaware District Court decision concerning an appeal of a bankruptcy settlement clearly provides support for the use of tender offers or other exchange, or settlement mechanics permitted under applicable federal securities laws prior to and outside a plan of reorganization. In essence, this decision permits debtors to utilize exchange offers to repurchase outstanding securities at a discount, or obtain more favorable terms during a bankruptcy proceeding and prior to confirmation of a plan of reorganization.

Case Summary

The Third Circuit Rules in Favor of the Bankruptcy Estate Creating a Further Circuit Split

The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.