Transfers and transactions up to ten years old may be scrutinized, unwound and recovered by a trustee, the bankruptcy court sitting in Massachusetts recently held in the NECCO (think chalky wafer candy) bankruptcy case. The ruling, in a case of first impression in Massachusetts, expands the reach back period from the typical four-year period for fraudulent transfer recovery, so long as the IRS is a creditor in the case.
Tolstoy warned that “if you look for perfection, you’ll never be content”; but Tolstoy wasn’t a bankruptcy lawyer. In the world of secured lending, perfection is paramount. A secured lender that has not properly perfected its lien can lose its collateral and end up with unsecured status if its borrower files bankruptcy.
On 11 October 2018, the Supreme Court (Court) vide its judgment in B.K. Educational Services Private Limited v Parag Gupta and Associates (Civil Appeal No. 23988 of 2017) clarified the applicability of Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code).
Background
The Supreme Court in its recent decision in K Kishan v M/s Vijay Nirman Company Private Limited, Civil Appeal No 21825 of 2017, has put to rest the question of whether an arbitral award that has been challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Act) by the award debtor can form the basis for an action under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (Code).
Background The corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) against Jaiprakash Infratech Limited (JIL) commenced when the National Company Law Tribunal, Allahabad (NCLT) passed an order dated 09.08.2017 admitting the petition of IDBI Bank Limited under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC). |
In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.
While secured creditors are entitled to special rights in bankruptcy, those rights may differ depending on whether creditors have a statutory or consensual lien on their collateral. This is primarily because section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that “property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement . . .
It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement. However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?
It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be. The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.
The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.