Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

The terms "ranking agreement" and "intercreditor agreement" are used interchangeably but generally refer to the same types of agreement - being those which regulate the priority of repayment of indebtedness owed to the creditors of an obligor. Strictly speaking, a ranking agreement is the Scottish equivalent to the English law deed of priorities and is typically used for shorter form ranking arrangements. As is the case in England, a Scottish intercreditor agreement is typically reserved for more complex arrangements and usually ranks both securities and liabilities in point of priority.

In our first and second summaries on the key differences in taking security between Scotland and England, I summarised the positions on the Scots law of assignation and share security respectively.  This is the third summary in that five part series and considers the position on floating charges in Scotland.

In England, it is common and quite straightforward for companies and LLPs to grant all assets security by way of a debenture which includes a series of fixed charges over specified assets, an assignment of material leases, insurances and other contracts and a floating charge over assets which are not expressly subject to those fixed charges. That same approach does not work in Scotland, at least not without some adaptation.

A floating charge will usually set out the rights exercisable by the floating charge holder after the point at which that floating charge has become "enforceable".  The floating charge might also contain language clarifying when the charge is deemed to be enforceable - typically after the occurrence of an event of default set out in the underlying facility agreement which is secured by that charge

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.