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When a secured creditor appoints a receiver it is usual for them to sign an agreement setting out the terms of the receiver’s appointment, including payment of the receiver’s remuneration, costs and expenses. Appointment documents commonly contain indemnity clauses in which the secured creditor agrees to indemnify the receiver in specified circumstances.

A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision may potentially place at risk an equity sponsor’s ability to retain proceeds from the sale of a portfolio company whose performance later deteriorates, where the selling sponsor acted in bad faith and the portfolio company was or became insolvent at the time of or on account of the sale.

Circuit Break? Delaware Bankruptcy Court Rejects Second Circuit Ruling on State Law Fraudulent Transfers

In our previous bulletin we discussed the ‘safe harbour’ model in the Government’s suggested reforms to the current insolvency laws.

This bulletin considers another of the focus questions in the Proposal Paper: the voiding of ipso facto clauses relating to insolvency events.

Background

On 29 April 2016, the Federal Government released a Proposals Paper titled ‘Improving bankruptcy and insolvency laws’.

The Government is proposing these reforms to encourage entrepreneurship and investment. It hopes to reduce the stigma and detriment around failed business ventures, while still balancing the need to protect creditors.

Private equity sponsors should be aware of two recent court decisions. One involves fiduciary duties under state law that may be owing to a limited liability company borrower by its managers, in the context of receivables financing facilities or other asset-based lending transactions involving the use of special-purpose vehicles. The other involves certain implications of governing-law choices under acquisition financing and related agreements.

Pottawattamie: Maybe Not So Special (Purpose) After All

Two recent court decisions may affect an equity sponsor’s options when deciding whether and how to put money into - or take money out of - a portfolio company. The first may expand the scope of “inequitable conduct” that, in certain Chapter 11 settings, could lead a court to equitably subordinate a loan made by a sponsor to its portfolio company, placing the loan behind all of the company’s other debt in the payment queue. The second decision muddies the waters of precedent under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on the issue of the avoidability of non-U.S.

Two recent court decisions may result in a broadening of the range of options available to an equity sponsor in respect of an insolvent portfolio company. The first decision may provide increased flexibility in structuring asset sales in certain chapter 11 settings, by utilizing escrows and other techniques to potentially avoid the need to apply asset-sale proceeds strictly in accordance with creditor priorities under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

Where a court has ordered the winding-up of a company, a shareholder may be able to have the winding up terminated under section 482 of the Corporations Act 2001.

Relevant factors

The power of the court to terminate a winding-up is discretionary. Relevant factors to be considered, which are not exhaustive, include the following:

When a portfolio company underperforms, a sponsor may consider various options to address the perceived performance issues, including changes to a portfolio company’s management team, cost structure, capital structure or other parameters, depending on the nature of the issue(s) at hand. When changes in capital structure may be desirable, often in the context of excessive debt and related liquidity issues, a sponsor’s choices may include a consensual workout outside of bankruptcy, or a court-supervised restructuring under Chapter 11 of the U.S.

If a director can exercise a right of set-off against a company in liquidation for a debt owed to the director or for a liability of the company to the director (which may be unascertained in amount or contingent), it may help to cancel out or significantly reduce the director’s liability to the company for insolvent trading.