Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.
A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.
A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals, Sutton v. Pilevsky held that federal bankruptcy law does not preempt state law tortious interference claims against non-debtors who participated in a scheme that caused a debtor—in this case a bankruptcy remote special purpose entity—to breach contractual obligations intended to ensure that the entity remains a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) and to facilitate the lenders’ enforcement of remedies upon a future bankruptcy filing, if any.
On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.
Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).
The High Court has struck down a company voluntary arrangement on the ground that it unfairly prejudiced a landlord who was to lose the benefit of a guarantee given by the tenant’s parent company. The judge said it was “unreasonable and unfair in principle” to require the landlord to give up the guarantee and there was “no sufficient justification” for requiring the landlord to accept a sum of money in lieu.