Last week, the Working Group for the Fiscal and Economic Recovery of Puerto Rico gave the broadest hint yet of the next tactic in Puerto Rico’s ongoing quest to deleverage itself.  Although the details have not yet been articulated, Puerto Rico apparently proposes to blend into a single pot several types of distinct taxes currently earmarked to pay or support different types of bonds issued by a number of its legally separate municipal bond issuers, with the hope that the resulting concoction will meet the tastes of a sufficient number of its differing bond creditors to induce them to

On June 29, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which held that claims asserted by counterparties in relation to bilateral repurchase agreements do not qualify for treatment as customer claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).

In a May 4, 2015 opinion¹ , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

A few reactions to today’s oral arguments before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit regarding the validity of Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act:

“The question that he frames in all but words

Is what to make of a diminished thing.”

                             Robert Frost, “The Oven Bird”

At the end of “The Candidate”, Robert Redford’s title character, having won, famously asks, “What do we do now?”

A similar question can be asked now that the federal district court in Puerto Rico has struck down the Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act.

In the aftermath of recent municipal bankruptcies in which issuers proposed and/or implemented bankruptcy plans involving partial discharges of the issuer’s payment obligation on insured bonds, there has been increased focus on whether municipal bond interest paid by a bond insurer after the bankruptcy plan’s effective date continues to be tax-exempt.

On August 11, Franklin Funds and Oppenheimer Rochester Funds filed a second amended complaint, opposition to motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment in the litigation they previously filed in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico challenging the constitutionality and validity of Puerto Rico’s so-called Recovery Act.  The second amended complaint reiterates that a PREPA filing under the Recovery Act, which establishes debt adjustment procedures for most of Puerto Rico’s public corporations, is both “probable and imminent.”  The summary judgment motion see