The last few years have seen the Commonwealth increasingly crack down on misuse of the Fair Entitlements Guarantee, or FEG, program. The cases that have resulted have led to various disputes in insolvency law about the priorities of different creditors. The priorities to be applied in insolvent trading trusts have been one issue recently puzzling lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike. Relief may well be around the corner, however, as the High Court is set to weigh in.

What the FEG?

On August 14, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision holding that section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a defense to the avoidance of preferential transfers to the extent the transferee provided new value to the debtor,[1] does not require new value to remain unpaid as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed.

On June 20, 2018, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision sustaining the debtors’ objection to the proof of claim filed by Contrarian Funds, LLC.

When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

Back in March 2017 the NSW Court of Appeal handed down the unanimous decision in Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sakr [2017] NSWCA 38 (Sakr), reigning in Brereton J’s application of proportionality to liquidator’s remuneration. This week the decision of in the matter of Australian Company Number 074 962 628 Pty Ltd (in liq) (formerly Colonial Staff Super Pty Ltd) [2017] NSWSC 370 (Colonial Super) was handed down by the NSW Supreme Court. The decision is notable as one of the first applications of the principles enunciated in the Sakr decision. 

In November 2016, the High Court of Australia heard a challenge brought by Clive Palmer in respect of the constitutional validity of the power of a liquidator to examine a former director of a company before the court. At the conclusion of that hearing, Kiefel J, as her Honour then was, stated that the Court was unanimously of the view that the challenge had failed and that reasons would be published later. Yesterday the High Court published those reasons.

The proceedings