The Supreme Court has held that a floating charge, crystallised by notice, prior to the commencement of a winding up, ranks ahead of preferential creditors. However, the Court expressed the view that the relevant legislation needs to be amended to reverse the “undoubtedly unsatisfactory outcome”.

Background

In a May 4, 2015 opinion¹ , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

On 13 May 2015, the Government announced that it intends to give the courts the power to overrule the rejection by secured creditors of arrangements under the Personal Insolvency Act 2012 (the “Act”).

There is scant detail in the announcement save that it is intended to “support mortgage holders who are in arrears” and that legislation is to be brought forward before the Summer recess. How is such legislation likely to work and what potential frailties could it have?

The Issue

Insolvency practitioners often encounter difficulties when trying to sell properties in residential developments because an original management company has been struck off the Register of Companies. The standard approach can be laborious and costly. A more cost efficient alternative is often available.

In a number of recent cases, borrowers have produced a detailed forensic analysis of the accrual of interest on their accounts by lenders alleging that any error in the calculation of interest invalidates the demand made by the lender and any appointment of a receiver on foot thereof.

Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC¹ that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.

InJ.D. Brian Ltd (in liquidation) & Others the High Court held that, where a floating charge crystallised prior to the commencement of a winding-up, the preferential creditors still had priority pursuant to in section 285 of the Companies Act 1963 over the holder of what had become a fixed charge.

The English court of appeal has held that a company should not be held to be balance sheet insolvent on the sole basis that its liabilities (including contingent and prospective liabilities) exceed its assets.

In BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail & Ors, the Court of Appeal considered in detail, for the first time, the construction of section 123 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986, which sets out circumstances in which a company can be deemed to be unable to pay its debts.

The relevant portions of section 123 provide as follows: