When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).

These are just a few of the big high street names which have sought to compromise their obligations to creditors in recent months via a company voluntary arrangement (CVA).

CVAs are designed as a flexible method by which companies can seek to contractually alter their position regarding different creditors – each CVA will be different, but it is typical, for example, for unsecured trade creditors to be treated differently to landlords. It’s worth noting that secured creditors are not bound by a CVA, unless they agree to this.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

The Recast Insolvency Regulation (Regulation 2015/848) (“Recast Regulation”) will apply to all member states of the EU (with the exception of Denmark) in relation to insolvency proceedings opened on or after 26 June 2017. The Recast Regulation takes a similar approach to that of the prior EU Insolvency Regulation (Regulation 1346/2000), which came into force in 2002. The Recast Regulation seeks to create a uniform code for insolvency jurisdiction, and cross-border recognition (within the acceding Member States).

The Insolvency Rules 2016 (the 2016 Rules) have effect from 6 April 2016. A key change introduced by the 2016 Rules is a new approach to decision making, including a deemed consent procedure. The new approach is designed to ease the administrative and cost burden in insolvency proceedings, and is summarised below.

Deemed consent

In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.