When it comes to voting on a plan, Section 1126(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court may designate (or disallow) the votes of any entity whose vote to accept or reject was not made in “good faith” (a term that is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code).

In LRH Services Ltd (in Liquidation) v Raymond Arthur Trew (1) Jason Marcus Brewer (2) and Derek O'Neill (3) [2018] EWHC 600 (Ch), LRH Services Ltd (LRH), acting by its liquidators, brought claims for breach of duty against three former directors. The claims arose from a reorganisation in 2009. LRH did not trade but had two trading subsidiaries (R and E) and it was wholly owned by CSGH, which also had another subsidiary in addition to LRH, CSG. Two of the directors of LRH were substantial shareholders in CSGH.

The reorganisation

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision which, among other things,[1] affirmed the lower courts’ holding that certain noteholders were not entitled to payment of a make-whole premium. The Second Circuit held that the make-whole premium only was due in the case of an optional redemption, and not in the case of an acceleration brought about by a bankruptcy filing.

On October 20, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an important decision regarding the manner in which interest must be calculated to satisfy the cramdown requirements in a chapter 11 case.[1] The Second Circuit sided with Momentive’s senior noteholders and found that “take back” paper issued pursuant to a chapter 11 plan should bear a market rate of interest when the market rate can be ascerta

On October 3, 2017, Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision holding that the Bankruptcy Court had constitutional authority to approve third-party releases in a final order confirming a plan of reorganization.

In Randhawa and Randhawa v Turpin and Hardy [2017] the Court of Appeal considered the comparatively simple question of whether the sole director of a company with articles that required two directors for a board meeting to be quorate, could validly appoint administrators under paragraph 22(2) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 (paragraph 22(2)). The complicating feature was that, whilst 75% of the shares in the company were held by the sole director, the remaining 25% were registered in the name of a long-dissolved Manx company.

Background

In less than a week after its bankruptcy filing, a debtor was able to obtain confirmation of its prepackaged plan of reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In allowing the case to be confirmed on a compressed timeframe that was unprecedented for cases filed in the Southern District of New York, the Bankruptcy Court held that the 28-day notice period for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan could run coextensively with the period under which creditor votes on the plan were solicited prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.

The case of Burnden Holdings (UK) Limited (in liquidation) v (1) Gary John Fielding (2) Sally Anne Fielding [2016] determined whether a claim in respect of breach of duty against two directors of Burnden Holdings (UK) Limited (Burnden) was time-barred. The alleged breach of duty was in connection with a distribution in specie. The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s decision and held that section 21 of the Limitation Act 1980 (LA 1980) applied so that the claim was not subject to the usual period of limitation.

In a June 3, 2016 decision¹ , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.