It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that claims generally crystallize as of the bankruptcy petition date. Of course, section 506(b) of the bankruptcy code allows over-secured, secured creditors to recover post-petition interest and costs, including reasonable legal fees, if their documentation provides them with the right to recover these costs. But what about unsecured creditors – are post-petition legal fees incurred by an unsecured creditor whose contract with the debtor provides for reimbursement of legal fees allowed or not?

Bankruptcy Rule 2004 allows the examination of any entity with respect to various topics, including conduct and financial condition of the debtor and any matter that may affect the administration of the estate. Does a subordination agreement that is silent on the use of Rule 2004 prevent the subordinated creditor from taking a Rule 2004 examination of the senior creditor? Yes, says an Illinois bankruptcy court.

Part III: Modifications Post-Discharge

Individuals have several options when filing bankruptcy. Chapter 13 is often preferred for individuals with regular income who wish to keep their homes and other secured assets. In a Chapter 13 filing, the court will approve the debtor’s three-to-five-year payment plan, which generally provides for curing any pre-petition delinquency, maintaining payments on secured debt, and a pro rata payment to unsecured creditors based on the debtor’s disposable income. After a Chapter 13 debtor completes his plan, he will receive a discharge of some of his remaining, unpaid debts.

Welcome to Part II of our series on the servicing of discharged mortgage debt (catch up on Part I). This part will discuss communications to discharged borrowers and evaluate various disclaimers that can be utilized.

Mortgage servicers are plagued by their nebulous relationships with the borrowers who discharge their personal liability in bankruptcy. Issues arise when the borrower whose debt has been discharged continues to engage with the mortgage servicer. These activities include making monthly payments and requesting and participating in loss mitigation. There are few, if any, bright line rules regarding this common scenario.

On December 22, 2018, the federal funding for certain agencies lapsed, and the United States government entered into a partial shutdown. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), including the United States Trustee Program (USTP), was one of the agencies that shut down. United States Trustees (“UST”) representing the USTP appear and litigate in a multitude of bankruptcy proceedings. USTs also actively participate in out-of-court settlement discussions, plan negotiations, and the like.

Two United States Bankruptcy Judges for the Southern District of New York recently issued a joint opinion addressing common issues raised by motions to dismiss in two separate adversary proceedings – one pending before Judge Bernstein and the other before Judge Glenn (the “Adversary Proceedings”). The Adversary Proceedings were filed by the debtors in two chapter 11 cases, each involving an Anguillan offshore bank – National Bank of Anguilla (Private Banking Trust) Ltd. and Caribbean Commercial Investment Bank Ltd. (the “Debtor Banks”).

Manley Toys Limited once claimed to be the seventh largest toy company in the world. Due to ongoing litigation and declining sales, it entered into a voluntary liquidation in Hong Kong. On March 22, 2016, the debtor’s appointed liquidators and foreign representatives filed a motion for recognition under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The motion was opposed by ASI Inc., f/k/a Aviva Sports, Inc. (“Aviva”) and Toys “R” Us, Inc. (“TRU”).

U.S. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 provides that on a motion brought by a trustee (and thus a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession as well) the court may approve a settlement. The prevailing view is that due to the court’s approval requirement, pre-court approval settlement agreements are enforceable by the debtor but not against the debtor. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently disagreed. It held that the statutory approval requirement is not an opportunity for the debtor to repudiate the settlement.