The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on September 10, 2024 issued its anticipated opinion in In re The Hertz Corp., with a majority holding that make-whole premiums constitute unmatured interest disallowed by the US Bankruptcy Code, but also finding that solvent debtors must pay creditors their full claims as dictated by contract, including make-whole and post-petition interest, before distributions can be made to equity.
Two recent cases out of the Third Circuit and the Southern District of New York highlight some of the developing formulas US courts are using when engaging with foreign debtors. In a case out of the Third Circuit, Vertivv. Wayne Burt, the court expanded on factors to be considered when deciding whether international comity requires the dismissal of US civil claims that impact foreign insolvency proceedings.
When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.
Background
One of the primary goals of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors with a fresh start by imposing an automatic stay and allowing for claims of reorganizing debtors to be discharged. In environmental law, a primary goal is to ensure that the “polluter pays” for environmental harms. These two goals collide when an entity with environmental liabilities enters bankruptcy. The result is often outcomes that are the exception, rather than the rule, with many unsettled areas of law that can be dealt with by bankruptcy courts in varying ways.
Recently, in In re Moon Group Inc., a bankruptcy court said no, but the district court, which has agreed to review the decision on an interlocutory appeal, seems far less sure.
In a decision likely to have a knock-on effect for future fraudulent transfer defense and valuation litigation, the Delaware bankruptcy court recently ruled that the price agreed in the sale of an oil and gas company closed by market participants represents the reasonably equivalent value for the assets being sold and is more reliable evidence of value than expert testimony prepared for the purposes of litigation.
Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the case of CII Parent, Inc., cementing the advice routinely given by bankruptcy counsel to borrowers in default. We always counsel borrower clients in default of the risk associated with lenders taking unilateral actions pre-filing, stripping debtors of valuable options and assets. Thus, we normally recommend to always obtain a forbearance and undertake the preparations required to file a bankruptcy petition immediately upon forbearance termination, although whether or not to file depends on variety of factors that should be considered.
The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.
A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.
Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.