Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.

Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.

On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit held that appellants’ state law constructive fraudulent transfer claims were preempted by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbors that exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for

On February 25, 2020, the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation^[1] struck down a judicial federal common law rule—known as the Bob Richards rule—that is used by courts to allocate tax refunds among members of a corporate affiliated group where the group does not have a written tax sharing agreement in place, or, at least in some federal Circuits, where an agreement fails to allocate the refunds unambiguously.

Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan generally requires the consent of each impaired class of creditors. A debtor can “cramdown” a plan over creditor dissent, however, as long as at least one class of impaired claims accepts the plan.

On January 14, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision resolving the question of whether a motion for relief from the automatic stay constitutes a discrete dispute within the bankruptcy that creates a basis for a final appealable ruling, or whether it simply is a controversy that is part of the broader Chapter 11 case, such that appeals would not need to be taken until the conclusion of the Chapter 11 case.

The consequences of an order or judgement being final or interlocutory are enormous. An order from an interlocutory order requires leave since these orders are not appealable as of right. In addition, a failure to obtain leave may result in the issue becoming moot. This is especially so when motions to lift the stay are involved: if the motion is denied and is not immediately appealable, by the time the case is concluded, the issues will most likely be moot.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, No. 13-3992-cv (L) (2d Cir., Dec. 19, 2019) that Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) barred claims seeking to avoid payments made by Tribune to its shareholders as part of a leveraged buyout (LBO).

Yes, says the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Court has the authority to confirm a chapter 11 plan which contains nonconsensual, third-party releases when such releases are integral to the successful reorganization. The court’s decision in In re Millennium holds that, when the third-party releases are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship, the Bankruptcy Court has the constitutional authority to approve nonconsensual, third-party releases.

Background

In the fifth opinion involving the repo liquidation saga of HomeBanc, the Third Circuit addressed several crucial issues involving the liquidation and valuation of repo collateral in bankruptcy. In re HomeBanc Mortg. Corp., 2019 WL 7161215 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2019).

Background