On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.
Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).
The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (the “Bill”) was published on 20 May 2020 and introduced a new debtor-in-possession moratorium to give companies breathing space in order to try to rescue the company as a going concern. The Bill went through the House of Commons on 3 June and passed through the House of Lords on 23 June. The Bill was back before the House of Commons today and is likely to receive Royal Assent next week (at which point the Bill will become law).
Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.
As set out in the first blog in this series, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (the “Bill”) introduces a new debtor-in-possession moratorium to give companies breathing space in order to try to rescue the company as a going concern.
No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.
Background
It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.
In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.
As set out in the first blog in this series, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (the “Bill”) introduces a new debtor-in-possession moratorium to give companies breathing space in order to try to rescue the company as a going concern.
On 20 May 2020, the UK Government introduced the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (the “Bill”) to the House of Commons. The Bill introduces a new debtor-in-possession moratorium to give companies breathing space in order to try to rescue the company as a going concern. The Bill is currently only in draft form and therefore amendments may be made. It is anticipated that the legislation will come into force by the end of June 2020.
This blog (the first in a series of blogs about this new measure) outlines the key provisions of the moratorium and how it will work.