Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).

The national lockdown in South Africa has left many companies financially distressed and unable to meet their contractual obligations. Looming on the landlord’s horizon may well be its approach to tenants who are placed under business rescue.

Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.

It is imperative that companies in financial distress prioritise their continued existence and consider business rescue as an alternative to liquidation. One of the major advantages of the business rescue process is the moratorium (stay) on legal proceedings which aims to give financially distressed companies sufficient breathing space to trade out of its insolvency. A temporary moratorium automatically comes into operation upon the filing of a resolution placing the company into business rescue or the issuing of an application for an order to this effect.

No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.

Background

It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.

In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.

It is imperative that companies in financial distress prioritise their continued existence and consider business rescue as an alternative to liquidation. Business rescue is a robust procedure that allows South African companies in financial distress or trading in insolvent circumstances to file for business rescue and with the assistance of a business rescue practitioner, reorganise and restructure the business with the aim of returning it to a more stable and profitable entity.

The Covid-19 pandemic has had a devastating impact on the South African economy with several enterprises struggling to remain profitable. Their continued operation remains threatened by the imposition of trade restrictions pursuant to the national lockdown and South Africa’s subsequent economic downgrade to junk status.

Two courts recently answered “yes,” finding that environmental claims brought against reorganized debtors by government entities were discharged under confirmed Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In In re Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79 (D. Del. 2020), the District of Delaware held that pre-petition, non-compensatory air quality penalties imposed on a Chapter 11 debtor by a state regulator were subject to discharge in bankruptcy. And in In re Peabody Energy Corp.

I.Exide Techs.: the Bankruptcy Code’s Exceptions to Dischargeability