Yes, says the First Circuit. The First Circuit recently affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny a group of bondholders’ (the “Bondholders”) motion to have a trustee appointed for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “System”) under section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 926 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a court to appoint a trustee to pursue avoidance actions in Chapter 9 cases.

Disagreeing with the much-critiqued SDNY opinion in Enron, the SDNY bankruptcy court disallowed claims brought by secondary transferees because the original claimants allegedly received millions of dollars in fraudulent transfers and preferences from the Debtors that have not been repaid. Deepening the district spilt on the nature of Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that the defense barring fraudulent transfer-tainted claims focuses on claims—not claimants—and cannot be “washed clean” by a subsequent transfer in the secondary market.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s holding that the contemporaneous exchange for new value defense to a preference action under § 547(c) applied to a creditor bank that released its liens for less than full payment.

In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit BAP held that the bankruptcy trustee could not recover two of the three payments that the debtor made to the bank during the 90-day pre-petition preference period.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently rejected a loan servicer’s appeal from a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling to remand to the lower bankruptcy court a punitive damages award for alleged discharge violations.

In so ruling, the Court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction regarding the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s ruling as to the punitive damages award, but affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s denial of the debtors’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees.

Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan generally requires the consent of each impaired class of creditors. A debtor can “cramdown” a plan over creditor dissent, however, as long as at least one class of impaired claims accepts the plan.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a consumer’s Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was barred by the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).

A copy of the opinion in Shaw v. Bank of America is available at: Link to Opinion.

The consequences of an order or judgement being final or interlocutory are enormous. An order from an interlocutory order requires leave since these orders are not appealable as of right. In addition, a failure to obtain leave may result in the issue becoming moot. This is especially so when motions to lift the stay are involved: if the motion is denied and is not immediately appealable, by the time the case is concluded, the issues will most likely be moot.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, No. 13-3992-cv (L) (2d Cir., Dec. 19, 2019) that Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) barred claims seeking to avoid payments made by Tribune to its shareholders as part of a leveraged buyout (LBO).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently reversed the denial of a lender’s motion to compel arbitration in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding for allegedly violating the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), holding that — despite conflicting clauses in two different relevant agreements — the parties had entered into a valid arbitration agreement that delegated the threshold issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.

Yes, says the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Court has the authority to confirm a chapter 11 plan which contains nonconsensual, third-party releases when such releases are integral to the successful reorganization. The court’s decision in In re Millennium holds that, when the third-party releases are integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship, the Bankruptcy Court has the constitutional authority to approve nonconsensual, third-party releases.

Background