In a May 4, 2015 opinion¹ , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:

Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC¹ that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.

The fourth additional provision of the Spanish Insolvency Act (IA) provides for homologation (court sanctioning) of a refinancing agreement signed by creditors representing at least 51 per cent of financial liabilities whilst meeting certain conditions set out in article 71 bis at the time of adoption of said agreement.

(Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil número 1 de San Sebastián, de 19 de noviembre de 2013).

Este auto afirma la competencia del Juzgado de lo mercantil de San Sebastián para declarar la apertura del concurso de la sociedad Fagormastercook SA con domicilio social en Wroclaw (Polonia). La concursada es filial de Fagor Electrodomésticos S. Coop., cuya solicitud de concurso había tenido entrada en el mismo juzgado, si bien en la fecha del auto estaba pendiente de declaración.

Presentación

El análisis de la Ley 9/2012, de 14 de noviembre, de Reestructuración y Resolución de Entidades de Crédito y de la aplicación de algunos de sus preceptos en supuestos con elementos internacionales exige partir de dos premisas: