On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.
Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.
La operación sobre los activos de una empresa que se prepara con anterioridad a la declaración de quiebra para ser ejecutada inmediatamente después de que se declare la quiebra (pre-pack) puede plantear problemas laborales.
Siguen sin resolverse satisfactoriamente las cuestiones laborales y de la Seguridad Social en relación con la transmisión de unidad productiva en concurso.
On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
En situaciones de crisis empresarial no son extrañas demandas de despido «tácito». Aunque se trata de una denominación no recogida por el legislador laboral, reproduce la posibilidad que el artículo 50 del Estatuto de los Trabajadores otorga al trabajador para extinguir su contrato en determinadas circunstancias y con derecho a la indemnización correspondiente al despido improcedente. Este tipo de demandas suelen coincidir con los procesos concursales, si bien la realidad temporal puede ser distinta.
La Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social viene oponiéndose a que se le aplique el artículo 176 bis.2 de la Ley Concursal en aquellos créditos cuyo vencimiento resultara anterior a la entrada en vigor de la reforma de la citada norma. Se entiende que ha de considerarse el pago de la deuda contra la masa a su respectivo vencimiento, en aplicación de la norma que estaba en vigor cuando se generó la deuda o, al menos, cuando se reclamó por parte de la Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social dicha deuda a la administración concursal.
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.